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Reforming the U.S. Banking System:
Lessons from Abroad
Bill Shaurf
John P?. Rowlettq
I. Introduction
In 1991, Congress rebuffed a Bush Administration attempt to re-
form the U.S. banking system. The goal of the proposal was to make
the U.S. banking system more profitable, more competitive, and safer,
both domestically and internationally.' The only provision that was
adopted was the replenishment of the bank insurance fund, and bank-
ing "reform" was not achieved.2
This article critiques the U.S. banking system from a macro per-
spective and offers recommendations to make it strong, both domesti-
cally and abroad. Part II of this Article reviews the reasons behind the
need for banking reform and provides an overview of the evolution of
the American banking system. Part III compares the banking systems
ofJapan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the banking system plan
for the European Community. This Article concludes that the way to
develop a superior U.S. banking system is to (1) relax restrictions on
banks with respect to bank ownership and with respect to the types of
businesses they can enter and who can own them; (2) impose strict
controls on banks with regard to financial health; (3) privatize deposit
insurance; and (4) eliminate the dual banking system and make the
Federal Reserve System the one supervisory authority over banks.
II. Why We Need Banking Reform
The banking industry in the United States is currently in terrible
shape. The industry has experienced large profit fluctuations, and is
t Woodson Centennial Professor of Business Law, College and Graduate School of
Business, University of Texas at Austin.
: J.D., University of Texas at Austin (1992); M.B.A., Southern Methodist Universtiy
(1987). I wish to thank my wife for all of the support she gave me and many of the ideas.
SSee generally U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYTEM: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFER MORE COMPETmVE BANKs (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
2 FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). This legislation authorized the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) to borrow $30 billion to shore up its nearly bankrupt bank deposit insur-
ance fund and to toughen some bank regulatory rules. Id.
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generally less profitable than in years past s there are hundreds of
bank failures each year,4 and the bank insurance fund had to be re-
plenished in 1991. 5 But how is it that our banking system, which was
once so mighty, has become so weak?6 There are a number of contrib-
uting factors.
A. Deregulation
In the 1970s the competition among financial institutions became
increasingly keen. 7 These increased competitive pressures led Con-
gress to pass measures that were deregulatory in nature.8 An example
of such a measure was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, 9 which was designed to provide greater
competitive equality among financial institutions.10 Important provi-
sions of this Act included eliminating Regulation Q limits on the inter-
est rates banks could offer on deposits; giving broader investment and
service authority for federal savings and loan associations; and giving
financial institutions the authority to offer NOW accounts.1 '
Another piece of legislation that further deregulated the financial
3 Overall profits for the banking industry were $25.3 billion, $15.5 billion, $15.9 bil-
lion, $18.6 billion, and $32.2 billion for the years 1988 through 1992, respectively. US. Banks
Post Record $25.3 Billion Profit While FDIC Coffers Dwindle in 1988, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No.
12, at 676 (Mar. 20, 1989); Bank Profits in 1990 Overshadowed by Big Bank Losses, Regional
Problems, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 692 (Apr. 15, 1991), FDIC-Insured Banks Earned
$18.6 Billion in 1991; 4th Quarter Earnings Quadrupled, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 442
(Mar. 16, 1992); BIF-Insured Commercial Banks Pull in Record Profits in 1992, 60 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 334 (Mar. 15, 1993).
"While the banking industry appears ready to finance a sustained recovery, 'it would be a
mistake not to recognize that the remnants of past mistakes will continue to plague the finan-
cial system for some time .....'" Bank Capital Standards Will Not Hurt Economic Expansion,
Greenspan Asserts, 59 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 740 (Nov. 23, 1992) (quoting AlanGreenspan) [hereinafter Bank Capital Standards].4 From 1942 until 1980 there were a total of 198 bank failures, and the greatest
number in any one year was 20. In 1983 there were 50 bank failures, and the number steadily
increased each year until 1989 when there were 206 failures. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1,
at 18 (fig. 2). In 1991, there were only 124 bank failures, but the average size of failing banks
increased, with the average total assets of failed banks standing at about $142 million in 1989
compared with $509 million in 1991. GAO Confirms FDIC $7 Billion Figure for 1991 BIFDeficit;
Looks at Fund's Future, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1035 (June 15, 1992).
Although the assets of failing banks have decreased slightly since 1991, figures for 1992
and 1993 indicate that failures are continuing at a rate of 100-125 banks per year. FDIC
Epects 100 Bank Failures in 1992; Regulators Give Views on Banks' Future, 59 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 589 (Oct. 26, 1992).
5 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6 TRASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-23. In 1983, three U.S. commercial banks
were in the rankings of the world's top twenty banks in asset size. But by year-end 1988, no
U.S. commercial bank was ranked among the world's top twenty. Id.
7 I. at XVIII-9, 10.
8 d,
9 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132-93 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Monetary Control Act].
10 ERIc N. COMPTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKIN 16 (1988).
11 Monetary Control Act, supra note 9.
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institutions industry was the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982.12 This Act
allowed liberalized real estate investment authority for national banks,
allowed mergers between weakened savings institutions and banks, and
required banks to offer money market accounts that were competitive
with money market mutual funds.13 This Act opened the door for the
real estate lending abuses that have played a significant role in the
banking system's poor health.' 4 On a broader scale, this era of deregu-
lation forced banks to be more competitive in terms of servicing cus-
tomers. 15 Of course the natural result from deregulation was a shake-
out of the uncompetitive companies, and the banking industry was no
exception. As a result, many more banks failed during the 1980s than
during the 1970s. 16 Deregulation, however, was not the only source of
the growing banking woes.
B. Third World Debt
In the 1970s, American banks began lending in force to Third
World countries.' 7 There were two rather simple reasons for this: (1)
the Third World nations needed capital; and (2) the banks were will-
ing to lend.18 Instead of taking the safer and more conservative policy
approach of internally generating cash flow by exporting more than
they imported, Third World governments took the riskier and quicker
method of borrowing the money.' 9 Banks, in turn, were very eager to
lend to developing nations because the loans produced hefty up front
fees that contributed significantly to the banks' quarterly profits.20 In
addition, the debtor nations appeared to be good credit risks at the
time the loans were made. First, repayment of the loans was generally
to come from revenues generated by exports of raw materials, such as
food products, metal, and oil.21 During the 1970s, prices for those
items were rising and there was no reason to believe they would fall in
the future.2 2 Second, inflation during the 1970s was high. High infla-
tion counteracted high interest rates so that real interest rates were low
or nonexistent. 23 This allowed countries to easily service debt. Finally,
because these loans were made either to the sovereign nations or were
12 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469-1548 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
13 Id.
14 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-11.
15 Id.
16 See supra note 4.
17 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-11.
18 Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reductions for Latin Ameri-
can Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 66, 72-73 (1991).
19 PEDRO-PABLO Kuczvrsvi, LATnN AMERICAN DEBT 38-39 (1988).
20 Id. at 40.
21 Id. at 35.
22 ALFRED J. WATKNS, TILL DEBT Do Us PART: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHO PAYS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 51 (1986).
25 Id.
1993]
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guaranteed by them, and those nations' economies appeared to be
strong, banks believed there was little risk of default.24
However, the banks miscalculated the credit worthiness of the
debtor nations, and the result was the Third World Debt Crisis. Four
main factors contributed to the crisis. First, restrictive monetary policy
by the U.S. government in 1981 was used to curb inflation.25 Simulta-
neously, the Federal Reserve increased interest rates.26 The result was
that real interest rates increased and made it more difficult for Third
World debtors to service debt.27 Second, these inflation curbing meas-
ures caused a recession not only in the United States, but also world-
wide.28 This resulted in lower prices for Third World countries' ex-
ports.29 Consequently, there was less revenue with which Third World
nations could service debt. Next, banks were not diligent in analyzing
the credit worthiness of the debtors.30 Many times, the banks were not
familiar with the projects to which the proceeds of the loans were go-
ing.31 Many of those projects were unsuccessful.a 2 If banks had been
more inquisitive and had analyzed those projects, they would have
been less reluctant to lend money for them. Finally, the U.S. dollar
was relatively cheap compared to other currencies during the 1970s.
Consequently, many wealthy investors in Third World nations trans-
ferred their money to the United States. These transfers adversely af-
fected those Third World economies.33
In August of 1982, Mexico announced that it was unable to make
its scheduled principal and interest payment on nearly $100 million of
debt owed to foreign governments and commercial banks.5 4 Other
debtor nations soon followed. Most new lending was stopped. Credi-
tors did provide some gap financing, however, to allow the debtor na-
tions to make interest payments. 35
Since 1982, commercial banks have worked feverishly to reduce
their exposure to Third World debt.3 6 The nine largest U.S. banks
managed to decrease their exposure to the fifteen largest Third World
debtors from $61 billion in 1982 to $40.1 billion in 1990.37 Likewise,
these banks increased their primary aggregate capital from $32 billion
24 Id. at 24.
25 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, at
92-93, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/82, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.D.8. (1988).
26 Id. at 92.
27 Id.
28 WATKINS, supra note 22, at 49.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 29.
31 Id. at 22.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 23.
34 Clyde H. Farnsworth, Debt Crisisfor Banks Said to End, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1989, at DI.
35 Santos, supra note 18, at 75.
36 Id. at 83.
37 Id.
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to $54.7 billion.38 This means that these banks reduced their debt ex-
posure from 191% of capital to 73.3% of capital in this period and
increased their average loan loss reserves for Third World debtors
from 5% of book value for Third World loans to 50% of book value for
these loans for the same period.3 9
As can be seen, Third World debt poses much less of a threat to
the health of U.S. banks now than it did at the outset of the crisis. In
fact, in 1989 leading bank regulators told Congress that Third World
debts no longer posed a threat to the U.S. banking system.40
C. Real Estate Lending
As much harm as Third World lending has done to the U.S. bank-
ing system, real estate lending has probably done more, because it per-
meates a much greater number of institutions, and there is much
greater exposure.41
This problem also originated in the 1970s. Banks' profitability was
being squeezed on several fronts. For instance, depositors substituted
higher interest money market funds and other investments for tradi-
tional bank accounts, 42 and large corporations stopped using bank
credit lines and started issuing their own commercial paper.43 To
counter the squeeze on profit margins, banks began making more
profitable and more risky loans to such entities as real estate develop-
ers. In the eleven years from 1979 to 1990, U.S. bank real estate lend-
ing increased by 316%. 4 4
This strategy, of course, did not fare well for American banks. As
of March 31, 1992, non-current real estate loans, which are those that
are either 90 days past due or on non-accrual status, were 5.38% of
total real estate loans. 45 This is a modest improvement compared to
June 1991 when the figure was 5.67%, which was the highest level in six
years. 46 Moreover, the commercial real estate market shows no signs
of improvement, which suggests that the current situation with real es-
tate lending could last several more years.47
a Id.
39 Id.
40 Farnsworth, supra note 34, at Dl.
41 Susan Dentzer, As the Banks Crumble, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REPORT, Jan. 21, 1991, at
55. As of November 13, 1990, the risk exposure for real estate among commercial banks was
$791 million. TaFAsuRV REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-11 (fig. 3).
42 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-9, 10.
43 Id. at XVIII-1 1.
44 Id. fig. 2.
45 FDIC Insured Commercial Banks Earned Record Quarterly Profits of $7.6 Billion, 58 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 1032, at 1032 (June 15, 1992) [hereinafter Record Quarterly Profits].
46 National Bank Earnings Fall by $1 Billion and Loans Drop by $23 Billion, OCC Says, Bank-
ing Daily (BNA) (Sept. 11, 1991).
47 See Record Quarterly Profits, supra note 45.
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D. Corporate Debt
Starting in about 1984, there was a relaxation of credit standards
by banks.48 Corporate raiders intent on acquiring undervalued stock
and management intent on taking companies private used this oppor-
tunity to borrow money to carry out their plans.49 Banks, believing
that the economic expansion would last forever, accepted the compa-
nies' overly optimistic projections in analyzing their credit worthi-
ness.50 Traditional debt-to-capitalization standards and debt-coverage
ratios that banks had used to determine credit worthiness were largely
loosened or ignored.5 ' Banks reasoned that even if the debtors de-
faulted, the assets that secured the loans could always be sold at rising
prices to pay off the debt.52 Moreover, tax treatment of interest pay-
ments has long favored capitalizing corporations through debt rather
than equity: interest payments are tax deductible, 53 while dividends on
stock are not.54 Finally, banks earned lucrative fees for engaging in
highly leveraged transactions. 55
Against this backdrop, banks had $190 billion of exposure to
highly leveraged transactions by November 1990.56 Recessions in in-
dustries that were particularly debt laden caused many companies to
collapse under these mountains of debt.5 7 The result is that by mid-
1991, there were approximately $50 billion in losses.58
E. Antiquated Legislation
A final contributing factor to the current troubles of the banking
system lies in antiquated legislation that continues to play a significant
and fundamental role in preventing the banks from being profitable.
The two most problematic acts were passed in an era when foreign
competition was nonexistent. They responded to concerns which,
while important at the time, are less important today.
1. McFadden Act of 1927
The McFadden Act 59 prohibits national banks from establishing
48 Robert F. Black, No Easy Cure for Red Ink, U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REPORT, May 6, 1991,
at 62.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See 26 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
54 MICHAELJ. GRAE"z, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON: PRINCIPLES AND PoUcIES 465 (1988).
55 WARREN F. COOKE, TOMORROW'S BAN.S: DIEvEWLOPMENS SHAPING THE 90'S 173 (1990).
56 TREASURy REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-11 (fig. 3).
57 Black, supra note 48, at 62.
58 Id.
59 National Bank (McFadden) Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 91-90, § 2, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228
(1927), as amended by Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 91-90, § 23, 48 Stat.
162, 189 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)).
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branches outside of the state where the bank is headquartered.6° The
McFadden Act also limits intrastate branching by national banks to
that which is permitted of state banks.61 National banks can only estab-
lish branches in a particular state if state banks are so permitted ac-
cording to state law. 62 However, this intrastate branching restriction
has been relaxed somewhat in recent years by the work of the Comp-
troller of Currency, Robert Clarke. The Comptroller took the position
that the definition of a "State bank" included a state-chartered savings
and loan, because state savings and loans have had bank-like powers
since the early 1980s. The Comptroller argued successfully that those
states that allowed intrastate branching by state-chartered savings and
loans must also allow branching by national banks, even if the states
did not allow intrastate branching by state banks.63
The problem with the McFadden Act is that by restricting banks'
abilities to establish branches, it imposes more costs on them and
causes them to be less competitive. 64 The original purpose of the Act
was to preserve the dual banking system by promoting competitive
equality between national and state banks.65 The theory was that com-
petition between state and national banking systems would lead to the
development of more efficient banking regulations.66 In practice, the
result is a less efficient banking system for two reasons. First, the Mc-
Fadden Act places restrictions on interstate branching. These restric-
tions increase the costs of expanding a bank's presence outside of its
home state because the bank must set up a separate subsidiary bank in
the other state instead ofjust opening up a branch office. This scheme
precludes American banks from realizing significant economies of
scale. 67 Second, if a state wishes to restrict competition and maintain
cartel banking, it can easily do so by prohibiting branch banking in any
form. 6s The ultimate result of this act is that it makes American banks
less efficient and less competitive.
2. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
The Glass-Steagall Act 69 generally prohibits commercial banks
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Dep't of Banking and Consumer Fin. v. Clarke, 809 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
64 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
65 Henry N. Butler, The Competitive Equality Doctrine and the Demise of Intrastate Bank
Branching Restrictions, 55 TENN. L. REv. 703, 707 (1988).
66 Id. at 709.
67 Id. at 710.
68 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 677, 693, 702-03 (1988).
69 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184-194 (1933)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, and 378 (1988)). The Glass-Steagall Act is the name
commonly used to refer to the above provisions.
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from entering the securities field and other non-banking activities. 70
Also, the Act prohibits entities that issue, underwrite, sell, or distribute
securities from engaging in the banking business.7 1 Members of the
Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") are precluded from being affiliated
with securities firms.72 The purpose of this Act was to protect bank
depositors against a repeat of the era of widespread bank closings of
the Great Depression. 73 Congress believed that the rash of bank fail-
ures was attributable in part to speculative activities by banks made pos-
sible by the connections between commercial banking and investment
banking.74
In fact, there is no evidence that the 1929 Stock Market Crash was
caused by the collapse of the banking system. Nor is there any evi-
dence to suggest that commercial bank securities activities caused the
failure of a single bank. 75 It has been shown that the causes of the
bank failures during the Great Depression were general economic con-
ditions, restrictive monetary policy, and protectionistic trade meas-
ures.76 Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System stated: "Research over the last 50 years
concludes, contrary to Congress' view at the time, that bank securities
activities were not a cause of the Great Depression and that banks with
securities affiliates did not fail in proportionately greater numbers
than banks more generally."77 On the contrary, most banks that had
securities affiliates survived the Great Depression.78 The health of and
confidence in the U.S. banking system was restored via the Banking
Act of 1933. 79 The Banking Act created deposit insurance and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It introduced badly needed
regulatory reforms, such as control over the capital requirements of
national banks, restrictions on interbank transfers, and greater author-
ity in bank regulators.8 0
The Glass-Steagall Act precludes commercial banks from fully en-
tering the securities business and effectively eliminates this means for
70 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
71 12 U.S.C. § 378 (a)(1) (1988).
72 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
73 Walter Henry Goodwin, Comment, Fily-Two Years After the Glass-Steagall Act: Do Com-
mercial Bank Securities Activities Merit a Second Look?, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 933, 936 (1984).
74 Id. at 936-37.
75 William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37
CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1988).
76 Id. at 286.
77 Legislative Proposals to Restructure our Financial System: Hearings on § 1886, § 1891, and
§ 1905 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 92
(1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
78 Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1987) (statement of EdwardJ. Kelly, III).
79 Isaac & Fein, supra note 75, at 288.
80 Id.
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banks to diversify and supplement their earnings. In this respect it has
made the U.S. banking system less competitive.
M. Comparison with Other Leading Banking Systems
In reforming our own banking system, it is useful to study other
banking systems that have operated quite effectively. There are some
significant differences between the U.S. banking systems and those of
Japan, Great Britain, Germany, and the European Community.
A. United States
1. In General
The United States has a dual banking system, i.e., banks can be
chartered at either the state or federal level.81 This system has resulted
in four different authorities overseeing American banks, with an indi-
vidual bank's chief regulatory authority depending on several factors.
The four regulatory sources are the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the various state banking
agencies.82
National banks are chartered by the OCC, and the OCC is the
chief regulatory agency for national banks.83 These banks also are re-
quired to be members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), and they
must carry FDIC insurance. 84 As a result, national banks must also be
supervised by the FRB, and the FDIC.85
State banks must all be chartered by a state banking agency and
must be regulated by that agency. However, they have a choice of
whether to be members of the FRS and whether to carry FDIC insur-
ance.86 This flexibility allows for three different possible scenarios re-
garding the regulation of state banks:
(1) State Banks, Not Members of the FRB (Non-Member), and
Not FDIC Insured (Non-Insured). These types of banks are regu-
lated and supervised only by the state banking agency. 87
(2) State Banks, Non-Member, FDIC Insured (Insured). These
banks are regulated and supervised by the state banking agency
and supervised by the FDIC.88
81 Emic N. COMPTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANING 8 (1988).
82 TREAsuRa REPORT, supra note 1, at XIX-1.
83 12 U.S.C. § 11 (1988); TiEsuR REPORT, supra note 1, at XIX-1.
84 12 C.F.R. §§ 1-35, 303-353 (1992).
85 TREAsuRv REPORT, supra note 1, at XIX-1.
86 12 C.F.R § 208.3 (1992).
87 EDWARD L. SyMMS,JR. &JAMESJ. WHITE, BANKING LAW 64-69 (1991). Only one section
of Glass-Steagall, 12 U.S.C. § 378, is applicable to state-chartered, nonmember banks; organi-
zations engaged in securities transactions are criminally liable if, at the same time, they en-
gage in the business of receiving deposits. Id. at 68.
88 12 C.F.R. § 303.1 (1992).
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(3) State Banks, Members of the FRB (Member), Insured.
These banks are regulated and supervised by the state banking
agency and the FRB, and supervised by the FDIC.8 9 The FRB regu-
lates and supervises bank holding companies, though it does not
regulate or supervise their subsidiary banks.90
American banks, unlike their counterparts in Europe and Japan,
are not allowed unlimited branching. The McFadden Act of 1927 and
subsequent amendments prohibit national banks from establishing
branches outside of the state where the bank is headquartered. 91 The
McFadden Act also limits intrastate branching by national banks to
that which is permitted of state banks.92 National banks can only estab-
lish branches in a particular state if state banks are so permitted ac-
cording to state law. 93
2. The Major Banking Acts
a. Federal Reserve Act of 1912
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 by the Federal
Reserve Act.9 4 The main reason behind the establishment of this sys-
tem was to stop banking panics attributable to the inability of banks to
convert demand deposits into cash.95 The Act provides, inter alia, that
(1) every national bank shall have to be a member of the Federal Re-
serve System;9 6 (2) member banks shall maintain a specified amount
of reserves against their demand and time deposits; 97 and (3) mem-
bers can get loans from the Fed by discounting commercial paper that
could be used to ease liquidity crunches.98
b. Banking Act of 1933
In the midst of all the bank failures of the Great Depression, the
Roosevelt administration and Congress responded by passing the
Glass-Steagall Act and the Banking Act of 1933.9 9 These acts of legisla-
tion were generally successful in restoring the public confidence in the
U.S. banking system. The Glass-Steagall Act legally separates invest-
89 12 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1992).
90 TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 1, at XIX-2.
91 See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988). There is speculation that Congress will be considering
interstate branching legislation in the near future, despite failed attempts in 1991 and 1992.
Anne C. Bryan et al., Bankers Await Clinton Regulatory Picks, Action Might Come on Community
Development Bank, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 67 Uan. 18, 1993).
92 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988).
93 Id.
94 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 38, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (current
version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-226 (1988)).
95 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at XVIII-3.
96 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1988).
97 12 U.S.C. §§ 461(b)(2)(A),(B) (1988).
98 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(7) (1988).
99 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 91-90, § 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
[VOL. 19
BANKING REFORM
ment banking and commercial banking.1l° Major provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933 include the prohibition of payment of interest on
demand deposits' 0 1and the creation of deposit insurance and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. 10 2
c. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricts the activities of a
bank holding company to those closely related to banking.'03 The
goals and effects of this legislation were to prevent bank holding com-
panies from circumventing the Glass-Steagall Act through ownership
of investment banking subsidiaries, 10 4 and to prohibit bank holding
companies from avoiding interstate branching laws established by the
McFadden Act.' 05
3. Permissible Business Activities
Since the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, American
banks have been permitted to engage only in traditional banking activ-
ities, i.e., making loans and taking deposits. 10 6 American banks are
expressly prohibited from engaging in investment banking activities,
such as underwriting corporate securities' 0 7 or dealing in securities.'0 8
Moreover, American banks cannot have officers, directors, or employ-
ees who are affiliated with investment banks. 10 9
However, in recent years, banks have found ways around the Glass-
Steagall Act to engage in activities that seem to have investment bank-
ing characteristics. The most significant of these activities is asset
securitization, which is the pooling together of many of a bank's loan
assets and then selling off interests in these pools to investors. The
majority of the pooled loans are mortgage loans, but the other popular
pools include motor vehicle installment loans and credit card receiv-
ables." 0 In addition, banks have been able to circumvent the laws to
enter into the insurance field in a limited manner.'
100 See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
101 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1988).
102 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988).
103 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1988).
104 12 U.S.C. § 1843(b) (1988).
105 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
106 Traditional or commercial banking is in reality much more complicated than making
loans and taking deposits. It also includes many activities which are arguably investment
banking and insurance activities.
107 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
108 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988).
109 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
110 Securitization of Bank Assets: An Outline of Current Legal and Regulatoy Issues, Pc.ric-
mNC LAw InSTruTE, ODR No. A4-4251, 1989.
111 Bank holding companies are allowed to provide: (1) credit life insurance; (2) insur-
ance activities in cities that have populations of 5,000 or less; and (3) any insurance activity
(except life, health, or annuities) if the bank holding company has total assets of $50 million
19931
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4. Disclosure Requirements
American banks are subject to extensive accounting and disclo-
sure requirements. Banks must periodically prepare and submit call
reports which contain extensive information on important financial
measures, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality,
earnings, and liquidity. Regulators use these call reports to determine
a bank's rating. This rating indicates a bank's relative financial health
and determines how much regulatory attention the bank warrants.' 1 2
Regulatory agencies conduct scheduled," 3 on-site examinations
of banks. The policies regarding examinations of institutions vary ac-
cording to which regulator is the primary regulatory authority. The
OCC maintains resident examiner teams in each national bank that is
the lead bank of a multinational banking company. Also, it assigns
each regional bank an examiner whose primary responsibility is to su-
pervise that bank. Additional examiners are assigned to multinational
and regional banks as needed to conduct specialized examinations and
asset quality reviews.'1 4 The FDIC, on the other hand, assigns an ex-
aminer to each bank and a team of examiners visits each bank on a
periodic basis, depending on the size and condition of the institu-
tion. 1 5 Finally, the Federal Reserve conducts on-site, full-scope exami-
nations of large, state member-banks on an annual basis." 6
Federally insured financial institutions are not uniformly required
to be audited by a certified public accountant. 1 7 Requirements vary
by regulatory agency. The OCC requires audits of newly chartered na-
tional banks.1 8 The FDIC requires audits of institutions for the first
three years after they receive federal deposit insurance" 9 and the Fed-
eral Reserve System requires audits of bank holding companies with
$150 million or more in total assets.' 20 The Securities and Exchange
or less. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (8) (1988). National banks are allowed to sell insurance in towns
with populations of 5,000 or less. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988). The OCC has also ruled that na-
tional banks can provide title insurance and annuities. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377
(Mar. 1987); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499 (Feb. 1990). The OCC has the power to de-
cide in which activities a subsidiary of a national bank may engage. It has been very liberal in
allowing various insurance products which it determines to be "incidental" to the business of
banking. Id.
112 ROBERT DALE, BANK SUPERVISION AROUND THE WoRLD 66 (1966); see also Connie M.
Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending: Part I, 19 INT'L LAw. 1059,
1073 (1985).
113 All regulatory agencies conduct bank examinations at least once per year.
114 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at IX-9.
115 Id.
116 Id. at IX-10.
117 Id. at XII-3. In practice, almost all of the larger institutions receive external audits by
CPAs. As of March 31, 1990, approximately two-thirds of all federally insured banks with 95%
of the industry's assets received external audits from CPAs. The audit rate of banks with over
$1 billion in assets was 99.9%. Id. at XII-4.
118 Id. at XII-3.
"9 Id.
120 Id. at XII-4.
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Commission, on the other hand, requires external audits of all publicly
held banking companies. 12
1
5. Loans to Single Borrowers
National banks are limited in the amount of loans or other exten-
sions of credit that can be extended to any single borrower to fifteen
percent of total unimpaired capital and surplus of the bank.
122
6. Capital Adequacy
Bank regulators require that banks maintain a system of risk-based
capital requirements. Currently, the minimum risk-based capital ratio
is 7.25%.123
There are two types of qualifying capital in computing this ratio:
Tier 1, or core capital, and Tier 2, or supplementary capital. Tier 1
capital must represent at least fifteen percent of a bank's total capital.
It consists of common stockholders' equity, certain types of perpetual
preferred stock, and the minority interest in the equity accounts of
consolidated subsidiaries, less goodwill. It is really the tangible equity
that is available to absorb unexpected losses. 124 Tier 2 capital consists
of a limited amount of loan loss reserves, certain types of perpetual
preferred stock not included in Tier 1 capital, intermediate-term pre-
ferred stock, and term subordinated debt. Tier 2 capital is limited to
the amount of a bank's Tier 1 capital. 1
2 5
Risk-weighted assets are assets that are placed in one of four risk
categories. Each category is given a risk weight of either zero, twenty,
fifty, or one hundred percent according to the credit risk of the asset.
The risk-weighted assets are multiplied by their category's risk weight
and summed to derive the total risk-weighted asset amount. This fig-
ure is the denominator in the risk-based capital ratio.
126
In addition to the minimum risk-based capital requirements, the
federal bank regulatory agencies require banks' Tier 1 capital to be at
least three percent of adjusted total assets. This is a distinct require-
ment from the risk-adjusted capital requirement. Any bank having a
ratio at or near the three percent minimum must have well-diversified
risk (including no undue interest rate risk exposure), excellent asset
quality, high liquidity, good earnings, and a strong organization with
the highest possible supervisory rating. If a bank does not have the
highest supervisory rating, it is expected to have Tier 1 capital/total
adjusted assets ratio of at least four percent. 12 7
121 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (1988).
122 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (1988).
123 Final Rule-Amendment to Regulations H and Y, 6 FED. Rs. BuLL. 84 (1990).
124 TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-6
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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These risk-based capital guidelines were endorsed in the Basle Ac-
cord by the central bank governors of the G-10 countries in July
1988.128 These guidelines were fully phased in by December 31,
1992.129 The Accord requires that all countries party to the agreement
have regulations requiring banks to have risk-based capital equal to at
least eight percent of risk-based assets.130
7. Liquidity Control
There are no standard liquidity ratios that banks must satisfy.
However, regulators do generally evaluate the individual banks' liquid-
ity position with respect to deposit volatility, ability to convert assets
into cash, reliance on interest-sensitive funds, and access to money
markets.131
8. Liquidity Support
The Federal .Reserve System can provide liquidity support to any
bank that maintains reserves with the appropriate Federal Reserve
Bank. These banks can borrow funds by discounting eligible paper or
by securing the borrowings with satisfactory collateral.' 32
9. Deposit Insurance
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides deposit in-
surance of up to $100,000 per account in the event of a bank failure.' 33
The FDIC was established in 1933 in response to the Great Depres-
sion.'5 4 The scope of deposit insurance has increased significantly
since 1933. The dollar amount covered by deposit insurance in 1933
was $2,500, compared to the current amount of $100,000.135 The
FDIC provides deposit insurance to all national banks, Federal Reserve
member banks, and to state chartered, non-Federal Reserve member
banks that qualify for coverage.' 3 6 All insured banks pay a flat rate
128 Bank Capital Standards, supra note 3. G-10 countries are: Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. The Basle Accord has also been adopted by the European Com-
munity and was implemented on December 31, 1992.
129 See Fed Cuts Loan Risk Weights in Haf for Some Residential Construction Loans, 60 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 4 (Jan. 4, 1993). The Fed has been considering revision proposals for
the standards set out in the Basle Accord. Fed Releases Consultive Papers on Banking Issues from
Basle Committee, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 682 (May 10, 1993).
130 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-5, 6, 7. See also, Basle Accord, U.S. Capital Stan-
dards Compared in Joint Treasisy-Fed Report, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1151 (June 29,
1992).
131 Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the
International Arena, 13 B.C. Ir'L. & CoMp. L. Rxv. 273, 281 (1990).
132 12 U.S.C. §§ 461(b)(2)-(7) (1988).
133 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(3) (1988).
134 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
135 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-1.
136 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1988).
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premium for deposit insurance, computed at a rate of 0.195% of total
domestic deposits.'3 7
B. Japan
1. In General
The Japanese banking system, like the British banking system, is
based on tradition and custom rather than strict rules.' 3 8 This regula-
tory style is called gyosei-shido or administrative guidance.'3 9 There is
much cooperation between government and industry. Regulators
often tailor regulations and policies to individual banks rather than
applying strict rules to all banks. The banks in turn voluntarily cooper-
ate with the directives given to them. 14°
The four types of banks in Japan are the commercial city banks,
commercial regional banks, long term credit banks, and trust banks. 14 1
The city banks are based in thirteen large cities and have many
branches nationwide.' 4 2 They also play a large role in international
lending.' 43 There are sixty-three commercial regional banks modeled
on city banks but on a smaller scale. 144 The three. long-term credit
banks provide long term funds. 145 They also play a significant role in
the international banking arena.1 4 6 The seven trust banks provide lit-
tle in the way of banking services; they deal largely in trust activities. 14 7
The city banks usually have a close relationship with major indus-
trial companies in Japan. This relationship is called keiretsu., which is
an informal affiliation between commercial banks and their industrial
customers. 148 In these keiretsu, officers of the banks are on the board
of directors of the client industrial company, and the bank owns signif-
icant blocks of the industrial company's stock.' 49
2. The Banking Law of 1927
The Japanese banking system is based on the Banking Law of 1927
137 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at VIII-21.
138 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1108.
139 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 289.
140 Id,
141 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1110.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 290.
145 Id.
146 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1110.
147 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 290.
148 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1110.
149 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 290. For recent limitations on relationships be-
tween parent companies and subsidiaries in the financial arena, see Japanese Agency Unveils
Rules to Achieve Transparency in Bank/Broker Relationships, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at
519 (Apr. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Japanese Rules in Ban/Broker Relationship].
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(Banking Law), as amended in 1981.150 It provides for two regulatory
authorities, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), 51 and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF).152 Of the two, the MOF is relatively more important.1 53 The
BOJ is primarily responsible for developing monetary policy. It does
this by using its influence on banks that borrow from it through BOJ's
discount window.' 54 The MOF, on the other hand, has been said to
have such broad powers that they approximate "those of the Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service, Securities and Exchange Commision, state
banking commissions, and policy-making responsibilities of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board." 55 Using these broad powers, the MOF exercises
"administrative guidance" to achieve its objectives. 156
3. Permissible Business Activities
The Japanese banking system prohibits banks from underwriting
most securities in a manner similar to Glass-Steagall.' 57 The one ex-
ception is that banks are permitted to underwrite and offer govern-
ment bonds and government guaranteed debentures to subscribers. 158
Banks are permitted to engage in businesses that are incidental to the
banking business. These businesses include real estate development,
leasing, bank equipment maintenance, and owning corporate stock of
companies that are debtors.' 59
4. Disclosure Requirements
Japanese Banking Law requires that banks submit interim and fi-
nal business reports to the MOF.' 60 Also, banks must make public fi-
nancial statements with explanatory notes within three months of the
end of the fiscal year.161
The banks have stringent auditing requirements. A bank must ap-
point a minimum of two auditors and one certified public account-
150 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1108 (citingJapanese Banking Law of 1927 (Law No. 21),
revised in 1981 (Law No. 59), effective Apr. 1, 1982 [hereinafter Japanese Banking Law]).
151 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 289 (citing Bank ofJapan Law 1942 (Law No. 67),
as amended Sept. 1, 1971 [hereinafter Bank ofJapan Law]).
152 Id. at 12.
153 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1109.
154 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1108-09 (citingJapanese Banking Law, art. 13, para. 2).
155 Stephen Bronte, Inside the Tokyo Ministty of Finance: The Most Powerfui Men in Japan,
EUROMONEY, June 1979, at 24.
156 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BANK SUPERVISION IN THE GROUP OF
TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND 57 (1984) [hereinafter GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND
SwrrZERLAND].
157 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 298. These restrictions on securities activities were
somewhat eased by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission on April 1, 1993. SJapanese Rules
in Bank/Broker Relationships, supra note 149.
158 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1109 (citingJapanese Banking Law, art. 10(2), 11).
159 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWrZERLAND, supra note 156, at 59.
160 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1109 (citing Japanese Banking Law, art. 19(1)).
161 Id. arts. 20, 21.
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ant.' 62 The auditors are responsible to bank management, and the
CPA is responsible to the bank's shareholders. 163
Banks are also subject to stringent examinations by regulatory
agencies. The MOF conducts surprise on-site micro inspections at
least every three years to ensure individual bank safety.164 The BOJ
conducts scheduled macro bank examinations at the same intervals to
check for industry stability. 165 Also, the MOF International Finance
Bureau performs on-site inspections to check the banks' foreign ex-
change operations.166
5. Loans to Single Borrowers
Before 1982, there were no statutory limits on the amount that
banks could lend to a single borrower. The MOF used administrative
guidance to effect limits on exposure to single borrowers.' 67 However,
an amendment to the Banking Law in 1981, coupled with an MOF
administrative order, now mandates the limits on loans to single bor-
rowers to twenty percent of capital for city banks and regional banks,
and thirty percent of capital for long term credit banks.' 68
6. Capital Adequacy
There are no statutory capital adequacy requirements.' 69 How-
ever, the MOF does exercise great influence in persuading banks to
meet certain capital adequacy ratios. For example, the MOF mandates
that a bank's capital should equal at least ten percent of total depos-
its;170 total loans should be less than eighty percent of deposits;17 1and
dividends paid out should be less than fifteen percent of equity capital
and forty percent of after-tax net income. 172
7. Liquidity Control
The MOF is less concerned about liquidity than other indicators
of financial health.' 73 However, the MOF has spoken on the subject of
a bank's liquidity. A bank's average of liquid assets must exceed thirty
percent of its total deposits. 174 The MOF has set forth specific guide-
162 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 62.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 61-62.
165 Id. at 61.
166 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 295-296.
167 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1112.
168 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 6.
169 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1113.
170 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWIzEAND, supra note 156, at 59. See a/so supra note
128 and accompanying text.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 60.
173 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 292.
174 GRouP OF TEN NATIONS AND SwrIZERLAND, supra note 156, at 57.
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lines in regard to Japanese banks' Eurocurrency operations. Banks
must fund term Eurocurrency loans exceeding one year with forty-five
percent Eurocurrency debt maturing in over one year.17 5 Also, banks
must fund Eurocurrency loans with maturities of more than three
years with more than fifteen percent Eurocurrency debt having maturi-
ties of at least three years.' 76
8. Liquidity Support
Banks can borrow from the BOJ on a short-term basis at the "Bank
Rate.' 77 The Bank Rate is determined by the amount of the bank's
yen assets. 178 In addition, banks can borrow from the BOJ on a longer
term basis if they secure the loan with adequate collateral.' 79
9. Deposit Insurance
Deposit insurance has existed in Japan since 1971 when the De-
posit Insurance Corporation (DIC) was founded by the government
and the BOJ.a80 Banks finance the DIC by paying premiums of 0.008%
of their total insured deposits.' 8 ' The DIC insures against losses up to
three million yen per account.'8 2
C. United Kingdom
1. In General
Bank supervision in the United Kingdom can best be described as
cooperation between government and industry.' 83 There is much in-
formal communication and direction between the banks and the Bank
of England (BOE), the central bank. Her Majesty's Treasury assumes
the role of supervisory agency over the industry, but it exercises this
control in a relatively restrained manner.'8 4 There is a general system
of guidelines and reporting requirements but relatively few hard and
fast rules that the banks must follow.'85 The system is codified, but the
supervisory aspect is still effected largely by moral suasion.' 8 6 The pol-
icy behind this loose system is the British belief that whenever possible,
government should accommodate rather than restrict different kinds
175 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1113.
176 Id.
177 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 296.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SwrrZERLAND, supra note 156, at 63.
181 Id. at 63-64.
182 Id. at 63.
183 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1085.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1086. This method of oversight has been a source of criticism of the U.K.
banking system in recent years. See BCCI Liquidator Sues Bank of England for Failing to "Properly"
Regulate BCCI, 60 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 812 (May 31, 1993).
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of banking business.187
2. The United Kingdom Banking Acts of 1979 and 1987
Prior to the passage of the U.K. Banking Act of 1979,188 the British
banking system was supervised largely by custom and tradition.18 9 The
Banking Act of 1979 provided the first statutory basis for supervision in
the United Kingdom.'90
The 1979 Act gives the Bank of England responsibility for super-
vising recognized banks and licensed deposit takers.' 9 ' The Act treats
these two types of entities differently.' 92 The main forms of supervi-
sion practiced by the BOE are requesting information such as financial
statements from banks, making recommendations, and issuing direc-
tives to the banks to effect compliance with the recommendations.' 95
The 1987 Act' 94 superseded the 1979 Act. The primary difference
between the two, however, is that the 1987 Act eliminates the distinc-
tion between banks and deposit takers. The term which now encom-
passes is "authorized institution."195
3. Permissible Business Activities
No formal restrictions are placed on business activities in which
banks can engage. 196 However, the Bank of England will generally
only permit banks to invest in non-banking activities if the activities are
financial in nature.' 97
4. Disclosure Requirements
Banks must furnish monthly reports to the Bank of England.1 98
The BOE uses these reports as a basis for discussion with senior offi-
cials in the banks.19 9 Banks are also required to submit annual finan-
cial statements to the Registrar of Companies in accordance with the
Companies Act of 1948.200 The BOE does not conduct examinations
of the banks, however. 201
187 Id. at 1085-1086.
18 8 J. MoISON ET AL., THE BANkING Acr OF 1979 (1979) (citing The U.K. Banking Act of
1979).
189 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1087.
190 Id.
191 DALE, supra note 112, at 58.
192 Id.
193 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1088 (citing Bank of England Act of 1946).
194 The United Kingdom Banking Act of 1987, reprinted in Halsbury's Laws of England
(vol. 4, 1987 re-issue).
195 The United Kingdom Banking Act of 1987, supra note 194, § 106(1).
196 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 94.
197 DALE, supra note 112, at 128.
198 GRouP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 99.
-199 Id. at 98-99.
200 Id. at 100.
201 Id. at 98-99.
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5. Loans to Single Borrowers
There are no statutory limits on the amount of loans that a bank
may provide to a single borrower. 20 2 However, the BOE has recom-
mended that the aggregate of such loans should not exceed ten per-
cent of a bank's capital. If the ten percent guideline is exceeded, the
BOE expects the bank to raise its capital base to maintain a stronger
capital adequacy ratio.203
6. Capital Adequacy
The BOE does not prescribe a precise figure for capital adequacy
of banks because it feels to do so would be too inflexible. 20 4 However,
the BOE uses two ratios in order to determine the capital adequacy in
light of the particular circumstances of the banks.205 The "gearing ra-
tio" relates the capital base to its current liabilities. The "risk-assets
ratio" relates the banks' capital to its potential losses. The risk-assets
ratio is the more traditional of the two.20 6
7. Liquidity Control
The BOE does not impose any specific rules with regard to a
bank's liquidity. 20 7 It does, however, monitor liquidity so as to ensure
against funding risk, the risk that a bank will not have sufficient cash
on hand to satisfy all obligations falling due on a certain day; and inter-
est rate mismatch risk, the risk that a bank will post losses due to ad-
verse fluctuations in interest rates.208 The BOE analyzes banks'
liquidity by placing banks' assets and liabilities into a maturity ladder.
The maturity ladder measures accumulated net mismatch positions.2°9
8. Liquidity Support
The BOE regularly provides short term liquidity to banks. It also
provides long-term support to large, financially stressed banks whose
failure could undermine the public confidence in the banking
system.210
9. Deposit Insurance
The Deposit Protection Board (Board), created in 1979, adminis-
ters the Deposit Protection Fund (Fund), which insures bank depos-
202 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1091.
203 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 97.
204 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1092. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
205 Id.
206 DALE, supra note 112, at 59.
207 Cane & Barclay, supra note 131, at 302.
208 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1093.
209 DALE, supra note 112, at 59-60.
210 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SwITzERLAND, supra note 156, at 100.
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its.2 11 The Board's scheme provides that seventy-five percent of a
deposit up to 20,000 pounds per institution21 2 is insured against loss in
the case of a bank failure. 213 The Fund is financed by mandatory fees
from banks. 214
D. Germany
1. In General
There are two general types of banks in Germany: full service
banks and specialized banks. 215  The full service banks
predominate.21 6 Within the full service bank segment, there are three
types of German banks: (1) private commercial banks-full service
banks that engage not only in lending, deposit-taking, and payment
transactions, but also in underwriting securities and securities trading;
(2) cooperative banks-commercial and agricultural credit coopera-
tives; and (3) public sector banks-savings banks and their central in-
stitutions. 21 7 The specialized banks focus on specific areas of
business.21 8 Examples are mortgage banks and other real estate insti-
tutions, installment credit institutions, postal savings offices, and banks
with other special functions.219 This article will consider only the su-
pervision of the commercial banks.
The German banking supervisory system is similar to that of the
United States in that it is rule based, rather than less formally directed
as in the United Kingdom or Japan. 220 Those rules are closely and
carefully read and narrowly interpreted, which encourages the discov-
ery of "loopholes."221
The German system is, however, similar to the Japanese and Brit-
ish banking systems in that there is much cooperation between govern-
ment and industry. A study of the system stated that "the prevalent
pattern of interaction between large German banks and their govern-
ment on matters of mutual international concern has been one of
quiet consensus, enhanced by official sensitivity to the banks' financial
interests and the banks' responsiveness to government incentives and
suasion."222 The supervising agencies regularly consult with senior of-
ficials of banks when formulating and refining rules and regula-
211 J. MORISON ET AL., supra note 188 (citing U.K. Banking Act of 1979 at §§ 21-33).
212 Id. (citing § 29 of the U.K. Banking Act of 1979).
213 Id. (citing U.K. Banking Act of 1979, §§ 58(1), 60(1)).
214 Id. (citing U.K. Banking Act of 1979, § 52(1)).
215 JUERGEN STEIN, BANKING SYSTEM IN GERMANY 5 (1982).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1098.
221 Id.
222 ARTHUR SPINDLER, THE Pourncs OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT: PRIVATE FINANCE AND
FOREIGN Poucv IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 181 (1984).
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tions.223 Also, banks tend to work through the Federal Association of
German Banks in proposing those rules.
22 4
2. The Banking Act of the Federal Republic of Germany
The Banking Act of July 10, 1961225 is the backdrop for bank su-
pervision in Germany. It established the Federal Banking Supervisory
Office (FBSO) as the main supervisory authority over banks.226 The
Bundesbank Act of 1957 established the Bundesbank.227 Its role is to
control monetary policy and to collect and evaluate commercial bank
reports.228 Once the Bundesbank has evaluated the reports, it for-
wards them to the FBSO so that it can take supervisory action on the
banks if necessary.229
3. Permissible Business Activities
German banks engage in "universal banking", i.e., there are no
limits on the types of businesses in which they can engage.230 Banks
can and do engage not only in deposit taking and lending, but also
underwriting, selling securities, and participating in nonfinancial activ-
ities such as ownership of nonfinancial companies. 23'
4. Disclosure Requirements
Banks must submit annual financial statements to the FBSO and
the Bundesbank.23 2 They must submit preliminary financial state-
ments within three months of the fiscal year-end and audited state-
ments within five months of year-end. 233 These statements are made
available to the public.234 Banks are subject to on-site inspections by
the FBSO or auditors appointed by the FBSO.235
5. Loans to Single Borrowers
The Banking Act specifies how much a bank can lend to any one
customer in some detail.236 The Act distinguishes between Grosskredite
223 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1100.
224 Id.
225 GEsErz UEBER DAS KREDrrWESEN (1961), translated in HANNES SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE
GERMAN BANKING SYSEM 65 (1978) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER].
226 Id. at 69 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 6(1)).
227 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1098 (citing Gesetz Ueber die Deutsche Bundesbank, July
26, 1957, as amended May 23, 1975).
228 Id.
229 SCHNEIDER, supra note 225, at 69 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 7(1)).
230 GRouP oF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND, supra note 156, at 39.
231 Id. at 3940.
232 SCHNEIDER, supra note 225, at 109 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 26(1)).
233 Id. at 109, 112 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 26(1), 27(1)).
234 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1100.
235 SCHNEIDER, supra note 225, at 135 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 44).
236 Id. at 77-97 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 §§ 13-20).
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(large loans) and Organkredite (loans to insiders). 237
Grosskredite are loans to a single borrower that exceed fifteen per-
cent of the bank's equity capital. 238 They must be reported to the
Bundesbank. 23 9 However, no Grosskredite is allowed to exceed fifty per-
cent of a bank's capital,240 and the total of all a bank's Grosskredite must
not exceed eight times a bank's equity capital.241
Organkredite are loans made to any company related to the bank,
any employee of a related company, or an employee of the bank.242 In
order to make an Organkredite, the bank's board of directors and man-
agers must approve the loan by a unanimous vote. 243 Also the bank
must report to the FBSO and the Bundesbank any Organkredite exceed-
ing DM250,000. 244
6. Capital Adequacy
The Banking Act does not specify any criteria for capital adequacy
for banks. A bank must maintain "adequate equity capital."245 How-
ever, the FBSO has stated in Principle 1246 of its regulations that loans
and equity participation, exclusive of loan loss provisions, may not ex-
ceed eighteen times a.bank's capital. 247 According to FBSO regula-
tions, in calculating the capital adequacy equation, the loans and
equity participation are risk weighted with the following factors:
ASSET RISK-WEIGHTING
Fully Secured/Guarahteed Loans 50%
Loans to Foreign Banks 50%
Loans to Domestic Banks 20%
Public Sector Loans 0%
Various International Loans 100%248
7. Liquidity Control
There is no statutory criteria for determining a bank's liquidity,
but the Banking Act mandates that banks must maintain sufficient li-
quidity at all times.2 49 FBSO regulations in the form of Principles II
237 Id.
238 Id. at 77-78 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 13(1)).
239 Id.
240 Id. at 81 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 13(4)).
241 Id. at 79, 80 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 13(3)).
242 Id. at 83 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 15(1), (2)).
243 Id. (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 15(1)).
244 Id. at 89, 90 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 16).
245 Id. at 76 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 10(1)). See supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
246 Grundsaetze Ueber das Eigenkapital und die Liquidat der Kreditinstitute, Jan. 20,
1969, as amended Jan. 16, 1980 [hereinafter Principles Concerning Capital].
247 GRouP OF TEN NATIONS AND SwmrzEMAND, supra note 156, at 40.
248 DiA, supra note 112, at 135.
249 SCHNEIDER, supra note 225, at 77 (citing The German Banking Act of 1961 § 11).
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and 111250 establish complex ratios for matching assets and liabilities
based upon their respective maturities. Principle II provides that cer-
tain long-term and fixed assets must be matched by certain long-term
liabilities.251 Principle III provides standards for a proper relationship
between medium-term assets and various short-term and medium-term
liabilities.2 52 If these standards are not followed, the FBSO may re-
quire corrective action.2 53
8. Liquidity Support
Banks have two options for receiving liquidity support, the
Bundesbank and the Liko Bank.2 5 4 The Bundesbank is the primary
source of liquidity for the banks.255 It sets limits as to how much each
bank can borrow from it for liquidity support.256 Thereafter, banks
must borrow from the Liko Bank. 257 The Liko Bank was formed in
1974 by the Bundesbank and the banking industry.2 58 Its role is to
assist solvent banks that are experiencing temporary liquidity difficul-
ties.259 The Liko Bank has not been used much to date. Also, it has a
relatively small capital base, which allows it to aid smaller banks
only.260
9. Deposit Insurance
The Banking Act does not prescribe deposit insurance. 261 How-
ever, the Federal Association of German Banks created the Deposit
Guarantee Fund (Fund), which protects deposits up to a limit of thirty
percent of the bank's equity capital or the size of the Fund, whichever
is smaller.262 Banks finance the Fund by paying fees of 0.003% of in-
surable deposits.2 6 3 Membership in the fund is voluntary. 264
E. European Community
The European Community (EC) passed the Second Banking Di-
rective on December 15, 1989.265 It has been implemented and is the
250 Principles Concerning Capital, supra note 246.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Friesen, supra note 112, at 1103.
254 Id. at 1105.
255 Id.
256 GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SwrrZERLAND, supra note 156, at 45.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. The Second Banking Directive continues the liberalization of
EC banking begun under the First Banking Directive. Banking and Secuitiea, EC Commenta-
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law on banking in the European Community.266 The general provi-
sions of the Directive are set out below.
1. Single License
Under the single license system, banks need only obtain a charter
in one member country of the EC in order to establish additional oper-
ations in any member state without having to go through further regis-
tration procedures. 267 However, the scope of activities that the bank
provides in any member state is dictated by the laws of the country that
granted the charter (home country), rather than the other member
countries in which the bank may be operating.266 Banks from EC
states with more restrictive banking systems will be at a disadvantage
when operating in states with more liberal banking laws because they
will still have to operate under restrictive laws. The single license/
home state law should create pressure on member states that have re-
strictive banking laws to liberalize them so that banks from those states
can remain competitive, both in the restrictive home state and in the
other states.2 6
9
2. Relations with Countries Outside the EC
The Second Banking Directive also has rules regarding non-EC
banks establishing subsidiaries within the Community. Basically, the
goal is to permit a non-member country to operate more banks within
the EC if the non-member country allows EC banks more access to the
non-member country's market.270 Another goal is to allow EC banks
to engage in the same activities in the non-member country as it does
in the EC.27 1 However, the mechanism used to achieve this end is
more subtle. Article 9 of the Directive provides that if the EC Commis-
sion finds that a non-member country is denying EC banks "effective
market access comparable to that granted by the Community," then
the EC Commission can mandate that negotiations with the non-mem-
des (Coopers & Lybrand) sec. 1 (Sept. 23, 1993), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp
File.
266 Michael Dynes, Home Loans May Come From Abroad-European Single Market, TIMES
(London), Jan. 2, 1993 at 1.
267 Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regula-
tions, and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of
credit institutions, amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1, art. 6 (1) (hereinaf-
ter Second Banking Directive].
268 OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS-
URY, E.C. SINGLE MARKET: BANKING AND SECURITIES (Aug. 1, 1989); see also Banking and Securi-
ties, supra note 265, para. 14.
269 Oversight Hearings on European Community's 1992 Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1989) (testimony of Manuel H. Johnson,
Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve System). See also EC Financial Market Regulation Analyzed at
London Conference, 58 Banking Rep. at (BNA) 970 (June 1, 1992).
270 Second Banking Directive, supra note 267, at art. 9.
271 Id. art. 9(3).
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ber country be initiated to obtain "comparable competitive opportuni-
ties for Community credit institutions" in the non-member
countries. 272 This provision should encourage non-member countries
with restrictive banking laws to liberalize them so that they can com-
pete in the lucrative EC market.
IV. What Should Be Done to Reform the U.S. Banking System?
A. Repeal Antiquated Legislation
1. Glass-Steagall Act
Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would permit banks to enter, with-
out restrictions, the securities industry and other financial industries
such as insurance. It would also permit banks to enter non-financial
industries as well.
The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 in response to a crisis. It
has been determined that securities activities by banks were not the
cause of the widespread bank failures which occurred during that time
and that banks which had securities affiliates did not fail more often
than banks without them.273 However, banks of today are no longer
the protected and steadily profitable businesses they were from the
1940s until the 1970s. The laws passed during the regulatory period
designed to insulate banks from competition are now barriers which
prevent them from adapting to changed market conditions. Banks
"are losing market share to GE Capital, Merrill Lynch, and even your
corner pawn shop."27 4
Allowing banks to enter other financial industries would give
banks opportunities to earn incremental profits by applying their ex-
pertise in related financial activities without increasing their costs ma-
terially. It would also allow banks to attract more capital by merging
with securities and other financial and non-financial firms. In short,
this move would allow banks to regain the competitive edge they lost
when banking became so heavily regulated.2 75
Also, the banks of Germany and the United Kingdom which are
allowed to engage in businesses other than traditional "banking" busi-
ness have shown that combining investment banking and other activi-
ties with commercial banking can be achieved successfully and without
undue risk to the bank or its customers. The implications of the Sec-
ond Banking Directive in the EC suggest that only the banking activi-
ties which are allowed in the United States will be allowed for
American banks operating in the EC. Thus, even though securities
272 Id.
273 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
274 FormerDIC Chairman Seidman Sees Need to Overturn Some Banking Regulations, 61 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 17 (July 5, 1993) (quoting former FDIC Chairman L. William
Seidman).
275 TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
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activities by German banks will be permitted in the EC, American
banks will not be allowed to participate in such activities in the EC
even though the German banks can.2 76 In addition, because the
United States does not permit the EC banks to engage in securities
activities, the EC could conceivably not allow the American banks any
access at all to the EC.2
7 7
Therefore, besides the fact that allowing American banks to en-
gage in investment banking activities would make them more competi-
tive in the global arena, it seems that if we want to compete at all in the
global arena we must expand the number of activities in which banks
can engage.
2. The McFadden Act
Repeal of this Act would allow banks to establish branches nation-
wide without having to set up separate subsidiary banks within a state.
Geographic expansion of large banks is a clear historical trend. Cur-
rendy thirty-three states allow ownership of banks by out-of-state hold-
ing companies; there is no branching across state lines, however. 278
By allowing nationwide branch banking, banks that expand geo-
graphically could realize huge cost savings. Instead of having to set up
entire subsidiary banks in other states and incurring the sizable costs
associated with such a move, banks could set up branch offices with
numerous types of cost savings. Fewer employees would be needed to
staff the out-of-state branches as compared to entire subsidiary
banks. 2 79 Reporting requirements and computer systems could be
consolidated at the headquarters of the main bank rather than main-
taining separate reporting requirements at each out-of-state subsidiary
bank.280 In addition, disclosure requirements to bank regulators could
be simplified so that regulators would only have one bank to examine
(albeit with many branches) compared to several (or more) subsidiary
banks in different states all examined independently. 28 1 The board of
directors at the main bank could be consolidated to alleviate the cur-
rent need to separate boards at each out-of-state subsidiary bank.2 82
Finally, auditing functions,28 3and capital requirements284 also could be
simplified as applied to one bank rather than numerous subsidiary
banks.
276 See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
278 TRzAsuav REPORT, supra note 1, at 50. "New House Banking financial institutions
subcommittee chairman Neal will continue to support passage of interstate banking and
branching legislation...." Bryan, supra note 91, at 71.
279 TRFASuty REORT, supra note 1, at 50.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 1d.
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The banks would not be the only parties to benefit from nation-
wide branching; consumers will also benefit. Under a more competi-
tive system, banks could be expected to pass their savings on to their
customers in the form of lower fees on checking accounts and other
services. Also, business and personal travelers will have better access to
their banking services when they are out of state.28 5 For example, cus-
tomers of Chemical Bank in New York, cannot obtain Chemical Bank
services in Texas from Texas Commerce Bank, even though Texas
Commerce Bank is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chemical. But if na-
tionwide branch banking were in effect, a customer of Chemical in
New York could get the same services in Texas as in New York.
Finally, the American banking system is the only one of the four
leading banking systems in the world (Japan, Germany and the United
Kingdom are the others) that does not allow nationwide branch bank-
ing. Nationwide branching works to the advantage of those countries,
and there are no unique economic circumstances in the United States
that would prevent branch banking from operating efficiently here as
well. Also, with the cost savings achieved by branch banking, U.S.
banks could be more competitive in the global arena against the other
banking powers.
B. Encourage Cooperation Between Industry and Government
Encouraging cooperation between industry and government is a
rather nebulous idea, yet it is a key factor in the success of the Japa-
nese, German, and British banking systems. In the United States, how-
ever, the relationship is virtually adversarial. Bank officials tend to
think that regulators do not know much about lending and can only
analyze loan portfolios superficially, i.e., by limiting their review to fi-
nancial statements and other written documents. Bankers think that
regulators cannot understand that a loan may still be good even
though the borrower posted a loss the year before. They also think
that bank regulators want to classify as bad as many loans as possible.
Therefore when regulators examine banks, bank officials become very
guarded and defensive about their portfolio and tend to put problems
in the best light possible instead of talking openly and honestly. This
leads to distrust between the parties. We believe that the adversarial
relationship it fosters is an affront to many conscientious examiners
and contributes to overzealous behavior by some. Both parties are, in
varying degrees, responsible for this lack of trust, and in the long term
it is inefficient, debilitating, and counterproductive.
Unlike our major competitors, in the United States there is no
government ministry or cabinet official making general policy about
the direction of banking, either on a macro or micro basis. For in-
285 Id. at 51.
[VOL. 19
BANKING REFORM
stance, if the Treasury had the power to persuade banks to curb real
estate or leveraged buyout lending from the beginning, losses in those
areas may have been curtailed. There is a much closer and better
working relationship between government and industry in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. In Japan, when the Ministry of Fi-
nance tells banks to curb lending in a certain markets, such as Ameri-
can real estate, the banks listen and comply. Cooperation of this
nature is an important factor contributing to the success of our global
competitors.
C. Revise the Deposit Insurance Scheme
Obviously, deposit insurance is overly broad and in need of re-
form. Currently, all bank accounts in banks which are members of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are insured up to
$100,000 in the event of bank failure. This has caused tremendous
losses to the FDIC when banks failed and the FDIC liquidated their
assets. Insuring every account has removed the incentive for custom-
ers to bank with strong institutions because customers know that, even
if the bank fails, their accounts will still be covered up to $100,000.
There are a number of alternatives which have been proposed for
reforming the deposit insurance system. In our view, the deposit insur-
ance system should charge higher premiums for higher risks, i.e.,
banks which are greater risks should pay higher premiums. The risk
factor of a particular bank could be calculated by a formula that would
take into account the bank's capital adequacy, its liquidity, and the
riskiness of its assets. In addition, deposit insurance should not reim-
burse customers for the total amount of deposits in the account, but
rather only for a specified percentage. This will force customers to use
due diligence in order to determine whether the bank is financially
healthy.
A good way to achieve the above ideals would be to combine FDIC
coverage with the private insurance industry to insure bank deposits.
The reason for involving private insurance companies is that the pri-
vate sector could better assess and price bank risk than a government
agency.286 Also, the private companies would take a small portion of
the insurance risk, say twenty percent, with the FDIC taking the rest.
Ownership by non-government entities would promote efficiency, bet-
ter pricing for insurance premiums, and earlier detection of problem
assets at banks.287
D. Eliminate the Dual Banking System
The Dual Banking System is based on the concept of federalism
286 Id. at 34.
287 See supra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
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that protects the right of states to regulate banking activities within
their borders. Also the choice of being regulated by either state or
federal law is supposed to promote competition between the state
banking system and the national banking system. However, as we have
already seen, the two systems do not compete against each other and
society is not extracting the benefits of such competition. Therefore,
the major aim of the dual banking system, increased efficiency through
competition, fails.
By eliminating the dual banking system and regulating banking
solely through federal law, social benefits will likely ensue. Banks will
be subject to federal regulators only and not state regulators. Often
times, state banks which are members of the Fed are subject to regula-
tion by both state and federal governments. These two types of regula-
tion often contradict each other. The federal government can
regulate the banking industry nationwide without conflicting regula-
tion by states and ensure the overall health and competitiveness of the
industry.
Opponents of the elimination of the dual banking system cite the
states' longstanding ability to regulate local matters and the tradition
of the dual banking system. However, the system is inefficient because
it requires increased expenditures to operate the state banking sys-
tems. Also, as noted earlier, the state systems sometimes conflict with
the federal system. Opponents further argue that since state banks are
usually members of the Federal Reserve System and the FDIC, the
banks consent to being regulated by the Federal government and the
state government. Given the consequences of not "consenting," how-
ever, the notion of consent-freely-given is extremely problematic. It
seems simply the essence of common sense that a bank would prefer
regulation by one authority rather than by two.288
Unlike the framers of the Constitution, the framers of the U.S.
Banking System were not able to produce a "living, breathing" system
which would be readily adaptable to the dramatic changes in our soci-
ety which have occurred over the past two hundred years. Over time,
lawmakers have kept the same system in place and modified it slightly
whenever the need arose. The result is a system which no one would
consider if given the opportunity to develop from scratch. Like the
U.S. government, the U.S. Banking System needs to be reinvented.
By taking four steps, our banking system can once again become
the envy of the world. Repealing antiquated legislation, like the Glass-
Steagall Act and the McFadden Act will allow banks to earn incremen-
tal income, diversify their risk, allow American banks to compete on an
even basis with European and Japanese banks, and allow banks to cut
288 In a letter to President Clinton, various professional associations of bankers ex-
pressed the desire to see the elimination of "unnecessary regulatory burdens and paperwork
'that impede economic growth.'" Bryan, supra note 91.
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costs and streamline their operations. Encouraging cooperation be-
tween government regulators and bankers will contribute to fewer
bank failures because good relationships foster better resolutions of
problems. The semi-privatization of deposit insurance will lead to less
expensive premiums for strong banks and fewer losses for the Bank
Insurance Fund. Finally, the elimination of the Dual Banking System
will lead to more efficiency by both regulators and banks and more
effective regulation.
Maintaining a strong Banking System is essential to the health of
our economy. Our system cannot afford to be burdened with outdated
laws which hinder its competitiveness and needlessly increase the costs
of doing business if we are to compete effectively in the global econ-
omy. Congress and the Clinton Administration should act swiftly to
reform our Banking System.

